The Critique Of Judgement
contributor: Eric Lease Morgan (Infomotions, Inc.)
creator: Kant, Immanuel
date: 0000-00-00
extent: 450391
format: text/plain
language: en
publisher: Eris Etext Project
rights: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/GPL/2.0/
source: 2
subject: judgement
subject: nature
subject: object
subject: taste
subject: concept
subject: representation
subject: permissible
subject: pure
subject: reason
subject: case
subject: terms
subject: kant
subject: immanuel
subject: critique
subject: western
subject: philosophy
type: text
local mirror: kant-critique-140.txt
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plain html: kant-critique-140.htm
sort title: Critique Of Judgement, The
full text: 1790 THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT by Immanuel Kant translated by James Creed Meredith PREFACE PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION 1790. The faculty of knowledge from a priori principles may be called pure reason, and the general investigation into its possibility and bounds the Critique of Pure Reason. This is permissible although "pure reason," as was the case with the same use of terms in our first work, is only intended to denote reason in its theoretical employment, and although there is no desire to bring under review its faculty as practical reason and its special principles as such. That Critique is, then, an investigation addressed simply to our faculty of knowing things a priori. Hence it makes our cognitive faculties its sole concern, to the exclusion of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure and the faculty of desire; and among the cognitive faculties it confines its attention to understanding and its a priori principles, to the exclusion of judgement and reason, (faculties that also belong to theoretical cognition,) because it turns out in the sequel that there is no cognitive faculty other than understanding capable of affording constitutive a priori principles of knowledge. Accordingly the critique which sifts these faculties one and all, so as to try the possible claims of each of the other faculties to a share in the clear possession of knowledge from roots of its own, retains nothing but what understanding prescribes a priori as a law for nature as the complex of phenomena-the form of these being similarly furnished a priori. All other pure concepts it relegates to the rank of ideas,* which for our faculty of theoretical cognition are transcendent; though they are not without their use nor redundant, but discharge certain functions as regulative principles.** For these concepts serve partly to restrain the officious pretentions of understanding, which, presuming on its ability to supply a priori the conditions of the possibility of all things which it is capa…